Abstract: Market failure arises in the Integrated Circuits (IC) industry due to high technical barriers and high R&D risk characteristics, providing the theoretical basis for government intervention in the industry. Due to the existence of market failure, however, the effectiveness of policy intervention may not be guaranteed. The National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (so-called “Big Fund”) established by the China State Council in 2014, allocating fiscal resources in a market-oriented approach, is a policy innovation that aims to target the market failure and government failure in the Chinese IC industry development, which marks the government’s direct intervention in the IC industry in achieving industrial goals. Ten years since its establishment, though a leap-forward has been witnessed in China's IC industry, nevertheless key industrial goals were not achieved and the Big Fund, at the end of the day, rendered the rent-seeking vehicle. Here we deploy the framework of the duality between government interventions and market mechanisms to conduct a systematic analysis on the Big Fund’s duality nature as a policy tool by design and the impacts of such mechanism. We then scrutinized the implementation-level factors that inevitably deviate the Big Fund from its policy design, with policy suggestions being put forward accordingly. Optimizing the Big Fund to leverage the advantages of government intervention and market mechanisms while effectively curbing government and market failures is suggested to be the key to promoting Chinese Integrated Circuit Industry development.

摘要： 集成电路产业的高技术壁垒与高研发风险特性决定了该产业具备产生市场失灵的若干条件，为政府对其进行政策干预提供了理论依据。然而，由于政府失灵的存在，政策干预的有效性并无法确保。我国在2014年设立的国家集成电路产业投资基金（“大基金”）是政府针对市场失灵与政府失灵的问题，运用市场化手段配置财政资源以促进集成电路产业发展的政策创新。 近十年来，大基金成功推动了我国集成电路产业整体实力的提升。但另一方面，一些关键产业目标未能实现，而且大基金及其子基金也相继出现腐败和效率低下的问题。本文采用政府干预与市场机制的二元框架，对大基金政策工具设计的二元属性以及机制设计的影响进行了系统分析。我们发现，由于大基金在执行层面存在着人事管理激励机制、监管及绩效评估体系不完善等问题，使其偏离了平衡政府干预和市场机制二元性的设计初衷。 如何优化大基金的运作，既能发挥政府干预和市场机制的优势，又能有效地抑制政府失灵与市场失灵，将是进一步推动我国集成电路产业发展的关键所在。