香港与内地科研项目管理的委托代理比较研究

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 科研项目管理中的一大难点问题是资助机构与科研团队之间的授权问题，即制度经济学中的委托代理问题。如果处理不善，委托代理问题会导致科研项目经费匹配不当、经费使用与研究目标偏离以及科研实践与评审机制脱节等诸多问题。该文从内地与香港的科研项目管理全过程的比较研究入手，系统分析科研管理中委托代理问题的表现与应对机制。研究发现，香港和内地不仅在项目申报、资金使用、科研活动监督与管理、课题结项与验收等诸多方面存在较大的差异，而且科研项目管理中委托代理问题的表现程度与性质也有很大区别。香港科研管理体制能够较好地应对科研项目管理的委托代理问题，比如项目申报与评审中的逆向选择、项目执行过程中的道德风险、以及科研活动的不确定性。根据研究结果，作者提出了拓展科研项目评审专家库、建立以绩效为导向的考评机制、提高资金分配灵活度、以及构建科研人员信誉信息系统等政策建议，从机制设计上有效解决科研项目管理中的委托代理问题。

Abstract: One of the most difficult issues in research project management is the delegation of authority between funding bodies, research institutions, and researchers, i.e., the principal-agent problem in institutional economics. If not handled properly, the principal-agent problem can lead to many issues such as improper matching of funding for research project management, deviation of funding use from research objectives, and disconnection between research practice and assessment mechanism. This paper starts with a comparative study of the whole process of research project management in the Mainland and Hong Kong as well as systematically analyses the manifestations and coping mechanisms of the principal-agent problem in research management. This paper finds that there are significant differences between Hong Kong and the Mainland in terms of project submission, funding use, supervision and management of research activities, project completion, and acceptance. Meanwhile, the extent and nature of the manifestation of the principal-agent problem in research project management also vary greatly. Hong Kong's research management system is better able to cope with several specific issues in research project management, such as adverse selection in project submission and evaluation, moral hazard in project execution, and uncertainty in research activities. Based on the findings of the paper, the authors put forward policy recommendations such as the expansion of the experts database, the establishment of a performance-oriented appraisal mechanism, the enhancement of flexibility in the allocation of funds, and the construction of a credibility information system for researchers, to effectively address the principal-agent problem in research management in terms of mechanism design.

邓格致吴逊杜迪佳谭欣盈袁泰来. 香港与内地科研项目管理的委托代理比较研究[J]. 科学学研究, 2024, 42(1): 126-135.

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