Abstract: This paper studies through theoretical analysis the existing mechanism of the phenomenon of soft institution constraint related to carbon reduction policy implementation in the mode of governance with Chinese characteristics,and uses China's 1999-2010 panel data to make empirical studies of its effects on capital-embodied technological progress and China's low-carbon transformation of industry. The results show that, in the situation of political promotion tournament and fiscal decentralization,China's strong local government is bound to "not fully implement" the central government's carbon reduction policies, and eventually lead to soft institution constraint by “race to the bottom line” effect which means the gradual relaxation of regulatory standards for carbon reduction and expansion of industrial scale. Soft institution constraint is the Granger cause of continuous reduction of capital-embodied technological progress and also the Granger cause of increase of inter-provincial industrial carbon emissions.Spatial econometric results demonstrate that despite capital-embodied technological progress has a very important role in inhibition of industrial carbon emissions,but soft institution constraint eventually lead to increase of inter-provincial industrial carbon emissions by causing the reduction of capital-embodied technological progress. So soft institution constraint is not conducive to realize expected carbon emission reduction goals and China's low-carbon transformation of industry.

摘要： 本文通过理论分析探讨了中国特色政府治理模式下碳减排政策实施中制度软约束存在的相关机理，并运用1999-2010年的面板数据实证检验其对资本体现式技术进步及中国工业低碳转型的影响。研究结果表明，财政分权及晋升锦标赛体制下的强势地方政府具有非完全执行中央政府碳减排政策的动机，通过逐渐放宽碳减排规制标准及扩大工业规模的“向底线赛跑”效应引致制度的软约束；制度的软化是导致资本体现式技术进步水平不断降低的格兰杰原因，同时也是省际工业碳排放增加的格兰杰原因；空间计量结果显示尽管资本体现式技术进步对抑制工业碳排放具有非常重要的作用，但制度的软化会通过引致资本体现式技术进步水平降低进而增加省际工业碳排放量，不利于预期碳减排目标的实现及中国工业的低碳转型。

关键词: 制度软约束, 资本体现式技术进步, 工业低碳转型, Soft Institution Constraint, Capital-embodied Technological Progress, Low-carbon Transformation of Industry