Abstract: This paper models Generic Technology R&D contract considering government technical support with a three-stage game, and studies generic technology R&D contract design which aims to maximize firm R&D input in the government perspective for the first time. Here are main results: When the government budget is enough large, the optimal generic technology R&D contract exists only. The optimal contract terms increases with the increase of budget and the optimal effort level for firm increases more quickly. Firm optimal input and the influence coefficient of firm and government which is related to generic technology R&D success is positive correlation and negatively related to the unit cost coefficient of the two sides. Considering the marketization process, Firm optimal R&D input, which is positive correlation to product market capacity based on generic technology, is negatively related to the degree of the externality of generic technology, difficulty of subsequent development, the product price sensitive coefficient and the unit cost of sales.

摘要： 针对产业共性技术研发投入不足及政府支持的重要作用，首次站在政府视角设计了以企业研发投入最大化为目标并考虑共性技术市场化过程的最优研发支持合同，对影响合同的因素进行了分析。研究结果表明：共性技术最优研发支持合同以足够大的政府预算为存在前提，企业最优研发投入随政府预算的增大而增大，其增长速度比政府支持投入更快；企业最优投入与企业和政府投入对共性技术研发成功影响系数正相关，与双方单位投入成本系数负相关；考虑市场化过程后，企业最优投入与基于共性技术的产品市场容量正相关，与共性技术外部性程度、后续开发难度、价格敏感系数及单位销售成本负相关。