关键词: 制度软约束, 资本体现式技术进步, 工业低碳转型, Soft Institution Constraint, Capital-embodied Technological Progress, Low-carbon Transformation of Industry

Abstract: This paper studies through theoretical analysis the existing mechanism of the phenomenon of soft institution constraint related to carbon reduction policy implementation in the mode of governance with Chinese characteristics,and uses China's 1999-2010 panel data to make empirical studies of its effects on capital-embodied technological progress and China's low-carbon transformation of industry. The results show that, in the situation of political promotion tournament and fiscal decentralization,China's strong local government is bound to "not fully implement" the central government's carbon reduction policies, and eventually lead to soft institution constraint by “race to the bottom line” effect which means the gradual relaxation of regulatory standards for carbon reduction and expansion of industrial scale. Soft institution constraint is the Granger cause of continuous reduction of capital-embodied technological progress and also the Granger cause of increase of inter-provincial industrial carbon emissions.Spatial econometric results demonstrate that despite capital-embodied technological progress has a very important role in inhibition of industrial carbon emissions,but soft institution constraint eventually lead to increase of inter-provincial industrial carbon emissions by causing the reduction of capital-embodied technological progress. So soft institution constraint is not conducive to realize expected carbon emission reduction goals and China's low-carbon transformation of industry.