关键词: “产学研”, 创新模式, 动态博弈, 委托——代理, 合作关系, 控制权, Industry-University-Research, innovation modes, dynamic games, principal-agent, cooperative relations, controlling right.

Abstract: Effective innovation mode with the “Industry-University-Research” Cooperation is one of the most important routes for the enterprises to improve its technological capabilities and innovation capacities, meanwhile it’s also the key for the high college to improve transformation rates for its own research outcomes. From the perspective of innovation types, main innovator-dependent and the optimal resources and capability allocation with the innovation process, two innovation modes with the “Industry-University-Research” cooperation are concluded: one is enterprise-established mode based on the high college -oriented, the other is the integrated innovation mode based on the enterprise-oriented, which is focused to be researched in this dissertation. In this mode, because the cooperative relation and controlling right are the two core variables in determining innovation effects, the cooperative relation between university and enterprise is divide into two types: long-term cooperation relation and short-term relation, and the controlling right is also divided into two ones: centralized controlling and decentralized controlling. Based on mentioned above, focusing on the cooperative innovation process of “Industry-University-Research”: systematic dimension including contract -providing, well-organized for the cooperation innovation process and the industrial competition by enterprise, by using the tools such as the Game Theory and the Principal-Agent Theory, one three-stage dynamic model is established, and four sub-game perfect nash equilibriums are also concluded under the conditions which contain the centralized(or decentralized) controlling under the short-term(or long-term) cooperative relation respectively，and the detailed analysis for each condition and its game outcome are also made respectively . Finally, from three dimension including cooperative relation, controlling right, and the principle-agent effect, some parameters equilibrium outcomes such as the innovation knowledge input, salary, production, prices and profits, and its differences are made from static and dynamic perspective.