关键词: 地方官员任期, 腐败, 企业研发投入, 调节效应, local official tenure, corruption, firm R&D investment, moderate effect

Abstract: Using a large micro-enterprise sample, from the perspective of official encourage, this paper studies the impact of official tenure and corruption on firm R&D investment under the current institutional arrangement of the cadre exchange, and it provides the microscopic evidence from transition countries about the relationship between governance of local officials and governance of corruption and sustainable economic development. The results show that, generally speaking, there is a reverse U-shaped relationship between local official tenure and firm R&D investment, and there is also a reverse U-shaped relationship between corruption and firm R&D investment, in other words, tenure extension of local officials and moderate corruption rate are conducive to reinforce firms’ R&D investment incentive, but overlong tenure of local official and excessive amount of corruption is bad for firm R&D investment, particularly, official tenure has a negative moderate effect on the relationship between corruption and firm R&D investment. Further investigation and we find that the effect of local officials’ tenure and corruption on firms’ R&D investment changes with the speed of marketization, industrial nature and ownership structure. The conclusion has important policy implication for promoting the governance of local officials and governance of corruption and accelerating China’s economic transformation.