高管持股、政府资助与高新技术企业研发投资——兼议股权结构的治理效应

科学学研究 ›› 2016, Vol. ›› Issue (9): 1371-1380.

高管持股、政府资助与高新技术企业研发投资——兼议股权结构的治理效应

翟淑萍¹,毕晓方²,³

1. 天津财经大学商学院会计系
2.
3. 天津财经大学

收稿日期:2015-10-28 修回日期:2015-12-17 出版日期:2016-09-15 发布日期:2016-09-22
通讯作者: 翟淑萍
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金青年项目“环境不确定性、管理者自信与企业创新投资：影响机理与经济后果”;国家社科基金青年项目“高管过度自信、财务冗余对企业创新的影响及对策研究”

Executives shareholding, Public Subsidies and Hi-tech Enterprises R&D Investment——With the Governance Effect of Equity Ownership Structure

Received:2015-10-28 Revised:2015-12-17 Online:2016-09-15 Published:2016-09-22

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以2010-2014年高新技术上市公司为样本，研究高管持股的利益趋同效应和管理防御效应如何作用于政府资助对研发投资的影响，以及股权治理机制能否对高管防御效应产生治理效果。研究发现：（1）政府资助对企业研发投资具有显著的激励效应；（2）高管持股比例适中时，政府资助对企业研发投资具有较强的激励效应；高管持股过高或过低时会产生管理防御效应，从而抑制了政府资助对高新技术企业研发投资的激励效应；（3）股权制衡度和基金持股比例的提高能够抑制管理防御的负面影响，从而增强政府资助对研发投资的激励效应。

Abstract: Based on Hi-tech listed companies from 2010 to 2014 as sample, this paper studies the executives shareholding interest convergence effect and managerial entrenchment effect how to apply to the effect of public subsidies for R&D investment, as well as whether does the equity governance mechanism apply to governance effect for managerial entrenchment effect. The study finds that: (1) The public subsidies for enterprise R&D investment has significant incentive effect;(2) When the proportion of executives is moderate, public subsidies for enterprise R&D investment has stronger incentive effect, while weaker incentive effect because of managerial entrenchment effect when executives shareholding is too high or too low;(3) To increase equity balance degree and the fund shareholding can inhibit the negative impact of managerial entrenchment effect to enhance incentive effect of public subsidies for R&D investment.

翟淑萍毕晓方. 高管持股、政府资助与高新技术企业研发投资——兼议股权结构的治理效应[J]. 科学学研究, 2016, (9): 1371-1380.