• 中国科学学与科技政策研究会
  • 中国科学院科技政策与管理科学研究所
  • 清华大学科学技术与社会研究中心
ISSN 1003-2053 CN 11-1805/G3

科学学研究 ›› 2018, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (10): 1737-1743.

• 科学学理论与方法 • 上一篇    下一篇

科学判断的方法论:元启发式对启发式的提升

蒋显荣   

  1. 长沙理工大学 社会治理创新研究中心
  • 收稿日期:2017-11-29 修回日期:2018-08-06 出版日期:2018-10-15 发布日期:2018-10-15
  • 通讯作者: 蒋显荣
  • 基金资助:

    智慧城市绿色治理中应用居民经验知识研究

The Methodology of Scientific Judgment:Meta-heuristic Optimizes Heuristics

  • Received:2017-11-29 Revised:2018-08-06 Online:2018-10-15 Published:2018-10-15

摘要: 启发式(Heuristics)诱发、影响科学判断,但提炼和使用启发式仍难以理性具体。启发式是将复杂问题简单化以应对特殊情况的思维模型,或它类似于简化了的科学推理流程。其方法论上的作用面临实践的诸多困境,当用其拆对具体问题时其应用能力则具有系统性的偏差。可能原因之一,启发式隐藏错误,导致不准确的科学判断。追究错误判断的“思维责任”追溯到了是否需要元启发式(Meta-heuristics)。启发式可以理解为一个有用或有效的思维模型,如果失去“元”的分析,其科学价值和认识价值就会降低;如果引入元启发式作为思维的第二阶,修正和限定启发式的范围,将提升科学判断。

Abstract: Heuristics induce and influence scientific judgment, but to refine and use it are still difficult to reason. A heuristic is a thinking model that simplifies complex problems into specific situations, or it analogies to a simplified scientific reasoning process. Its methodological role is faced with many difficulties in practice, and when it is used to solve specific problems, its application ability is systematic deviation. Perhaps one of the reasons is that heuristics hide errors and lead to inaccurate scientific judgments. The "thinking responsibility" for false judgment traces back to the need for meta-heuristics . The heuristic can be understood as a useful and effective thinking model, if the loss of "meta" analysis, the scientific value and the value of knowledge will be reduced; introducing meta-heuristic as second order thinking, and defining the scope of heuristic correction, that will enhance the scientific judgment.