• 中国科学学与科技政策研究会
  • 中国科学院科技政策与管理科学研究所
  • 清华大学科学技术与社会研究中心
ISSN 1003-2053 CN 11-1805/G3

科学学研究 ›› 2023, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (1): 181-192.

• 技术创新与制度创新 • 上一篇    

研发补贴、非研发补贴如何影响企业创新投入

熊凯军   

  1. 海南大学经济学院
  • 收稿日期:2021-05-31 修回日期:2021-08-09 出版日期:2023-01-15 发布日期:2023-01-15
  • 通讯作者: 熊凯军

Asymmetrical Impact of Government R&D Subsidy and Non-R&D Subsidy on Enterprise Innovation Investment——Empirical evidence from my country's listed companies from 2007 to 2019

  • Received:2021-05-31 Revised:2021-08-09 Online:2023-01-15 Published:2023-01-15

摘要: 政府补贴对企业开展创新活动和持续性发展意义重大。为了探讨政府研发补贴与非研发补贴对企业创新投入的影响,以及企业金融化与所有权性质在两者间的调节作用。本文运用我国2007~2019年上市企业数据,基于信号理论分析政府研发补贴与非研发补贴对企业创新投入的非对称影响,并探讨企业金融化与所有权性质在政府补贴影响企业研发投入的联合调节效应。结果发现:(1)政府的研发补贴会对企业创新投入产生倒U型影响,政府非研发补贴会对企业创新投入产生积极影响;(2)企业金融化会使得政府研发补贴对企业研发投入倒U型影响效应更凸,并负向调节政府非研发补贴对企业研发投入的影响;(3)国有企业属性会负向调节政府非研发补贴对企业研发投入的影响,且国有企业的金融化对政府研发补贴与企业研发投入的倒U型关系的调节作用弱于非国有企业;(4)东部和中部地区,以及中小板和创业板的企业,政府研发补贴与非研发补贴对企业创新投入存在非对称影响。

Abstract: Government subsidies are of great significance to the innovative activities and sustainable development of enterprises. In order to explore the impact of government R&D subsidies and non-R&D subsidies on corporate innovation investment, and the moderating role of corporate financialization and the nature of ownership. This paper uses the data of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2019 to analyze the asymmetric impact of government R&D subsidies and non-R&D subsidies on corporate innovation investment based on signal theory, and explores the joint adjustment effect of corporate financialization and ownership in government subsidies affecting corporate R&D investment. The results found that: (1) government R&D subsidies will have an inverted U-shaped impact on corporate innovation investment, and government non-R&D subsidies will have a positive impact on corporate innovation investment; (2) corporate financialization will make government R&D subsidies affect corporate R&D investment The inverted U-shaped impact effect is more prominent, and negatively regulates the impact of government non-R&D subsidies on corporate R&D investment; (3) The attributes of state-owned enterprises will negatively regulate the impact of government non-R&D subsidies on corporate R&D investment, and the financialization of state-owned enterprises The adjustment effect of the inverted U-shaped relationship between government R&D subsidies and corporate R&D investment is weaker than that of non-state-owned enterprises; (4) In the eastern and central regions, as well as small and medium-sized board and GEM companies, government R&D subsidies and non-R&D subsidies affect corporate innovation investment There is an asymmetric effect.