Abstract: Based on the sample data spanning from 2008 to 2013 of private small and medium-sized listed firms, this paper examines the impact of government subsidies on the firms’ R&D investment from a new perspective of political connection. The empirical results show that private firms with political connection do get more government subsidies, and moreover, the poorer the institutional environments are, the more meaningful for private firms to establish political connection. For private firms with political connection, government subsidies exert “stimulation effect” on R&D investment, which means that establishing political connection is an efficiency-promoting behavior for private firms. The results still exist when endogenous problems are controlled. From the view of the government, political connection has become a supervision mechanism by restricting the managers’ abuse of funds to increase operating efficiency of private firms and achieve the goal of policies so as to promote the development of national economy.

摘要： 以2008至2013年中小板民营上市公司为样本，基于政治联系的新视角研究政府补贴对民营企业研发投入的作用，实证研究发现：有政治联系的民营企业获得更多政府补贴，并且在制度环境较差的地区，民营企业更易通过政治联系获取政府补贴；有政治联系的民营企业获得的政府补贴对研发活动产生“刺激效应”，即民营企业通过建立政治联系获取政府补贴是一种促进研发投入的效率行为，该结果在控制了内生性问题后依然成立。从政府的角度看，政治联系已成为政府对民营企业的一种监督机制，约束管理层滥用资金的行为，从而提高民营企业的运营效率，实现政策目标，推动国民经济发展。