Abstract: In this paper, the author studies the state-owned companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchange, from 2007 to 2014, based on political identity, exploring the impact of political promotion on innovation investment. We also further analyze the effects of regulatory independence and process of marketization. The article research the conclusion is: in the SOEs, political promotion has inhibitory effect to the innovation investment, in addition, the inhibition in the enterprises directly under the central government is not significant, but is much more obvious in the local state-owned enterprises. Further study found that the process of marketization will weaken the influence of the very effect, namely the high process of marketization of the region, and weak inhibition of political promotion.

摘要： 论文以2007-2014年深沪两市国有上市公司为样本，基于委托代理理论、制度理论，探讨国有企业高管政治晋升与创新投资的关系，以及国有企业所受监管的独立性和所处地区市场化进程对这一关系的影响。研究结果表明，国有企业高管的政治晋升会抑制创新投资，同时这种抑制作用在地方控制国有企业中更加明显，而在中央控制国有企业中并不显著，即外部监管独立性会影响政治晋升与创新投资的关系。此外，相较与市场化进程较慢的中西部地区，东部地区国有企业高管政治晋升对创新投资的抑制作用较弱。