Abstract: Abstract: Using game theory method, this paper study the formation and stabilization problem of patent pools. According to the fact that patent pools are closely aligned with standard in nowadays, we confirm that ex-post patent pools can not be sustainable, due to the motivations of patent holders to freeing riding and holding up downstream producers. While during the standard setting process, patent holders， joint commitment to licensing royalty can lead to ex-ante patent pools，information. As a result of non-cooperative game,ex-ante patent pools are self-enforcing and can improve social welfare.

摘要： 摘 要:用博弈论的方法研究了专利联盟的组建和稳定性问题。针对现代的专利联盟与标准紧密结合的事实，证明了事后的专利联盟因专利持有人搭便车和对下游制造商进行敲竹杠的动机而难以维系。而在标准制定过程中，专利持有人对许可费进行联合承诺则会导致能够引导事前专利联盟形成。作为非合作博弈的结果，事前的专利联盟是稳定的并有利于提高社会福利。

关键词: 标准, 专利联盟, 双重边际, 敲竹杠