关键词: 研发外包, 控制权配置, 合同的不完全性, R&D outsourcing, the allocation of control rights, contractual incompleteness

Abstract: As a contractor in the process of R&D outsourcing, the agent will disclose the new R&D path to the third party if the new path emerges. In order to prevent the possible behavior of the agent, the principal will allocate the optimal control rights to himself at the beginning of R&D outsourcing. The more the control rights are, the possible disclosing behavior will be more effectively prevented and the more benefits the principle will have, however, the more the control rights are, the more costs that the principal bear will be. As a result, the optimal control rights will be allocated based on the benefits and the costs. In the process of allocating control rights, the optimal control rights that the principal retains will become more as the contracts become more incomplete. Furthermore, different from the theoretical results of Lerner & Malmendier(2010), that the principal allocates optimal control rights will dominate that the principal does not allocate any control right. Empirical evidences do support these results.