关键词: 研发补贴, 合作研发, 技术溢出, 供应链管理

Abstract: This paper considers two factors which may weaken firms’ innovation enthusiasm, including horizontal technological spillovers between competitive firms and "double marginal effect” of innovation between supply chain partners. By constructing and solving several multi-stage games, we analyze and compare two R&D subsidy policies, that’s, supplier subsidization and government subsidization, under two R&D modes of manufacturers (i.e., non-cooperative or cooperative R&D). Two significant advantages of government subsidies are found. First, since the government always offers a greater R&D subsidy compared with the supplier, it can promote innovation and improve social welfare more effectively. Second, subsiding non-cooperative and cooperative R&D by the government leads to the same market outcome, while the effect of supplier subsidization depends on manufacturers’ R&D modes. In addition, different participants in the supply chain have inconsistent preferences for different R&D subsidy policies.