人工智能时代的技术授权与道德责任

科学学研究 ›› 2025, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (1): 189-196.

人工智能时代的技术授权与道德责任

曲蓉

南京信息工程大学

收稿日期:2023-12-13 修回日期:2024-02-23 出版日期:2025-01-15 发布日期:2025-01-15
通讯作者: 曲蓉
基金资助:
人工智能的责任伦理研究

Technological Delegation and Moral Responsibility in the Era of Artificial Intelligence

Received:2023-12-13 Revised:2024-02-23 Online:2025-01-15 Published:2025-01-15

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在人工智能时代，技术授权可以在暂时搁置人工代理资格的情况下集中讨论人工智能代替人类行事、接受人类委托任务的问题。人工智能仅能代替人类完成整个行为计划的一部分，而非行为本身。随着人工智能的发展，技术授权的范围由单态行为逐渐扩展成行为群，未来可能扩展至整个行为坐标系，此时，人工智能体就成为了完全的人工代理。经由技术授权，人类与人工智能形成了特殊的人机交互关系，带来了远距离、匿名性等问题并创造出新的行为层面，进而对道德产生了重要而复杂的影响。既然道德上的善恶产生于人机联合实践之中，相应的道德责任也应归属于人机联合的责任体。行为责任和角色责任相结合可以将人机联合责任继续分配给不同的行为者个体。

Abstract: In the era of artificial intelligence, the very idea of the technological delegation could be focused on discussing the issue of artificial intelligence acting on behalf of humans and accepting tasks entrusted by humans while temporarily suspending the question of the qualification of artificial agents. Then, artificial intelligence could complete a part of the action plan on behalf of humans, rather than the whole action. With the development of artificial intelligence, the scope of technological delegation gradually expands from the mimeomorphic action to the behavioral groups, and ultimately extends to the entire action coordinate system, and make the machine a complete agent. Through technological delegation, humans and artificial intelligence have formed a special human-machine interaction relationship, which has brought about problems such as distance and anonymity, and created new action levels, thereby having important and complex impacts on morality. Since moral good and evil have arisen from the practice of human-machine interaction, correspondingly moral responsibility should also ascribe to the human-machine joint actors. The combination of action responsibility and social role responsibility can continue to allocate joint responsibility to different individual actors.

曲蓉. 人工智能时代的技术授权与道德责任[J]. 科学学研究, 2025, 43(1): 189-196.

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