Abstract: Facing the financing dilemma of green innovation of manufacturing enterprises, how to solve the problem of information disclosure and promote the financial innovation of financial institutions to invest in enterprises is the key to realizing the green transformation and upgrading of China’s manufacturing industry, and government regulation is a necessary means to promote green innovation of enterprises. Based on this, a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, enterprises, and financial institutions is constructed, and the evolutionary process of the interactive effects of government regulation on the green innovation of manufacturing enterprises is analyzed using evolutionary game theory and Python simulation. The study found that: (1) government regulation can significantly affect corporate information disclosure behaviors and promote the willingness of financial institutions to invest in green innovation. (2) the greater the government’s penalty factor for concealing information, the better it is for companies to evolve in the direction of public information. (3) When the reward coefficient is moderate, the larger the government’s reward coefficient for corporate information disclosure and financial institution investment, the better it is to overcome the problems of corporate green innovation information disclosure and financing dilemma, and to realize the green transformation and upgrading of manufacturing. Enterprises bring value-added, and enterprises give government feedback subsidies. When the feedback coefficient is large, both companies and financial institutions will evolve in a direction that is conducive to the development of green innovation.